

**CONFEDERAL CONSOCIATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION**
*Overcoming the traditional 'dialogue of the deaf' between federalism and
intergovernmentalism in European integration*

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INTRODUCTION

The post-11 September 2001 world has made the question of European integration not only more important but more pressing. The French President has called it 'urgent'. In the European Union (EU), decades of wrangling over extradition and other legal niceties seem to have given way to effective cooperation in the fields of interior and justice policies. The EU has also recently announced (October 2001) that it is planning to move forward the setting up of its Rapid Deployment Force to coincide with the European Council meeting in Brussels-Laeken in early December 2001 (instead of the original date of late 2003). This is not the place to discuss the wider implications of global terrorism and how to fight it. Nor what the implications of the militarizing of the Union will be for the concept of a 'civilian power Europe'ⁱⁱ.

This paper deals with recent and future institutional and other decision-making reforms within the European Union. Less than a year after the (in?)famous new Nice Treaty which concluded the longest ever European Council meeting in early December 2000, there is now a new debate over the future of the European Union. The European Commission published in July 2001 its own *White Paper on European Governance*. A date has already been set for all the current and future ideas, concepts and proposals for reforms to culminate in a new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) set to start in 2004. A group of eminent persons will in the meantime be constituted to inform the wider debate. A Convention, due to start in March 2002, will prepare the ground for the 2004 IGC. It will consist of representatives from all 15 EU member state governments, the Commission, the European Parliament, and national parliaments. As enlargement negotiations are also expected to be concluded by the end of 2002 for the 'lucky few' of

the first wave of accession countries, the current debate over where the Union goes will also benefit from inputs from countries that have been on the margins of the West European integration process for a long time.

This paper represents therefore a contribution to the 'future of Europe' debate. It consists of two parts:

- Part 1 presents the current political landscape in the European Union following the signing of the Nice Treaty and the negative vote in the Irish ratification referendum. There are also other signs of growing Euro-pessimism, even Euro-skepticism, in many EU states.
- Part 2 considers the current debate over the *finalite politique* of the Union which was launched in May 2000 by the German foreign minister Joschka Fisher. It reviews a number of concrete proposals for reforms. It concludes that there are three different main schools of thoughts: first, the supranationalists/federalists (or 'community method'), second, the intergovernmentalists/confederalists, and finally third, those who combine a mix of federal, confederal and other approaches. This paper clearly sides with the last of the three approaches, known as 'Confederal Consociation'.

PART 1 - POST-NICE 'BLUES' IN EUROPE?

This section covers the Nice European Council meeting (December 2000), the Nice Treaty (February 2001), and the implications of the Irish referendum of May 2001, as well as a number of Euro-pessimistic, even Euro-skeptic, trends within the public opinions of the EU member states in recent months. One also needs to recall here the October 2000 rejection of the euro by the Danes. I try here to illustrate not only a certain amount of confusion about where the EU is headed but also growing pessimism and disillusion about the 'European dream'. Nothing is irreversible in politics but, in light of the upcoming EU enlargement to the East and South, it remains necessary to pursue a clear objective for the Union.

The Nice European Council meeting led to a number of well-deserved criticisms, not only because the meeting failed to take important decisions besides the fact that an agreement was reached on ‘numbers and figures’ which allow for enlargement. Not a small achievement in itself but it is the manner in which such an agreement was finally arrived at (at 4.00 am!) that will undoubtedly leave its mark. The atmosphere of the meeting and in particular the French Presidency tactics, with most of the blame leveled at the French President Jacques Chirac, led to a number of caustic comments which have marked the EU history for years to come. In brief, the French took a rather authoritative approach to their middle-man chairing role and pushed very hard for their own agenda. The latter can be summed up as trying to prevent the Germans from breaking away from an equality with the other EU ‘big states’ despite its clear economic and demographic weight following its 1990 reunification. This was seen as a last-ditch attempt before Germany’s leading role in the EU is likely to expand even further after the eastern enlargement.

The outcome of the Nice meeting has been described as a ‘face-saving’ⁱⁱⁱ, minimal^{iv} - though ‘necessary’^v- accord that came out of a ‘petit sommet’^{vi} with innumerable ‘marchandages peu glorieux’^{vii}. It was also seen as a failure for further integration as it confirmed perhaps the ‘triumph of national states’^{viii}. Others were even more straightforward: the ‘melodrame de Nice’ witnessed ‘un bras de fer public franco-allemand sans precedent’^{ix}. Comments attributed to Chancellor Schroeder (‘it does not promise anything good for the future of the Union’^x) do not augur for a better future either. More clement approaches favoured the fact that the Treaty itself was ‘neither triumph nor disaster’^{xi} or blamed the problems on the French Presidency and Chirac in particular^{xii}. The French President eventually came to accept some of the blame^{xiii} but his remarks did nothing to remove the feeling that all that was achieved was the result of ‘L’Europe du bricolage’^{xiv}.

Whatever the future outcome of the new Treaty, it was formally signed in February 2001. The only referendum to date, in Ireland, produced a negative vote in June 2001: 54% voted against in a low turnout (32%). This paper does not discuss the reasons for such a result. It only stresses how important the Irish vote is, especially when it is put in its

wider Euro-pessimist or even Euro-skeptic environment both in the EU and in applicant countries. Recent opinion polls results show mounting disillusion with the EU^{xv} and unclear support for the single currency^{xvi}. This extends to East European applicant countries, especially Poland^{xvii}, the largest in terms of population (40 million). This paper also notes -but does not elaborate on it- that there appears to be a growing discrepancy between the views of the elites and those of the publics in the EU member states. In what a Spanish journalist described as a 'autoflagelacion publica'^{xviii}, the Fifteen agreed in July 2001 that there was a chasm between the citizens and the institutions in Europe.

The European Parliament was so dissatisfied with the Nice Treaty that it has recommended to the EU national parliaments not to ratify it. The Belgian and Italian parliaments have said they would not ratify it.^{xix} Notwithstanding (and therefore more worryingly), the French *Assemblée Nationale* had ratified the Treaty in June 2001 by 407 votes in favour to 27 against, with 113 abstentions. The German *Bundestag* followed suit in October with 570 votes in favour and 32 against^{xx}. The question of democratic accountability and legitimacy falls beyond the direct scope of this paper but it deserves to be addressed seriously all the same^{xxi}. What follows covers the post-Fischer debate.

PART 2 - THE CURRENT 'FUTURE OF EUROPE' DEBATE

The post-Fischer debate (May 2000) has relaunched the debate over the future of Europe (the so-called *finalite politique*). A number of politicians have responded to the German foreign minister, most recently Lionel Jospin, the Socialist French prime minister, in late May 2001. The fact that the Nice Treaty revisions have not led to a fundamental restructuring of the way the Union works should not be seen as a failure of the Fischer initiative. To a large extent it was as much premature as it was overdue. Overdue, because the Union must answer some key questions about its purpose, what it does and how it does it, prior to enlargement. Premature, because the December 2000 deadline of the Nice European Council meeting meant that there was very little time for other politicians to respond to the German foreign minister.

Between May 2000 and the summer of 2001 a number of proposals for reforming the Union pre- and post- Nice have materialised. There are many ways of looking at what the political leaders and other politicians in Europe are proposing. They can be divided into 3 groups. Federalism and intergovernmental (or supranational versus cooperation) have been the leading integration approaches for both academics and practitioners. A third, less known, approach, Confederal Consociation, is the one favored in this paper. What are the main characteristics of these groups and how do they affect recent proposals for change in the so-called post-Fischer debate about the future of Europe?

FEDERALISM

First, there the group of what can be called the 'die-hard' federalists. They represent the original theorists of integration and/or their successors. The integration process in what was then a post-World War II, divided and devastated Western Europe saw nationalism as the cause of war and called for a supranational approach to European politics. To their credit, federalists have a clear political agenda. They want to see a Federal United States of Europe.

Among others, their contemporary successors can be listed as follows: in Germany, Fischer, Chancellor Schroeder and President Johannes Rau; in Belgium (currently holding the Presidency of the Council in the second half of 2001), Prime minister Verhofstadt; in France, Commissioner Michel Barnier and Francois Bayrou who is both an MEP and the *Union pour la Democratie Francaise* Party President; in Greece, Premier Costas Simitis. One should also add to this list the current Commission President, Italy's Romano Prodi. They all agree with the more traditional federalist approach based on the Founding Fathers' *finalite politique* which included initially a functional, low-key steps after the collapse of the EDC. But for them, 'now' (meaning any time now) is the time to federate.

There are of course some nuances among all of the above cited people. But they all agree with the philosophical basis that federalism is the only viable solution for the future of Europe. With regards to how to reform the Union, they all favour a fully-fledged European Federation with a written constitution, which will come about after a

Constituent Assembly is organised. In terms of division of powers, they want more powers for the European Commission, which should be come in Schroeder's own words, 'a strong European executive'. Its President should be either directly elected or selected by national state representatives *a-l'americaine* or *a-l'allemande*. That is to say the way the US Federation Presidents have been chosen by the so-called 'Grand Electors'. In Germany it is the *Lander* representatives that elect the President of the Federal Republic of Germany. Fischer has expressed his preference for the direct election of the Commission President by universal suffrage throughout the Union.

The European Parliament should also be given more powers, especially in law-making and budgetary matters, thus becoming a true Parliament. The current Council of Ministers which represent the member states should also be turned into a Senate (a second chamber *a-la* US Senate, or *a-la Bundesrat*) in the traditional federalist division of powers. As Fischer put it in his 12 May 2000 Humbolt University (Berlin) speech, 'federal is the only way'^{xxii}.

Romano Prodi argued that the Commission was growing step by step into a government and that the Rapid Deployment Force was leading to a 'European army'^{xxiii}. The Commission President also argued for the need to turn the Commission into 'the voice of the union's economic policy'^{xxiv}. His plans did not stop there. He also wants the Second Pillar of the EU (the CFSP and now CESDP) to become part of the Commission's prerogatives, that is to say to 'communautarize' it:

'in 2004, I would like to see the EU merge all our foreign policy instruments into one single external policy structure. This structure should be located in within the Commission, with special rules and procedures tailored to the needs of security and defence'^{xxv}.

The Belgian and Greek Prime Ministers, respectively Guy Verhofstadt and Costas Simitis, also called for a federal Europe. Verhofstadt agreed with all of Fischer's proposals. He also suggested the creation of a European tax^{xxvi}. Simitis was somewhat more circumspect about a clear division of power on a federal basis and stressed rather the role that political parties should play at the European level. But on the whole he favoured a federal Europe^{xxvii}. More support for the federalist view came from Bayrou who claimed that there could be no Europe without federalism^{xxviii}.

Federalism argues that the EU is the latest and most sophisticated stage of a road towards a European Federation which began in the aftermath of WW2 (for a descriptive account, see the work of John Pinder, and that of the London-based *Federal Trust*). They emphasise the primacy of European law, the existence of supranational institutions and the single currency. To them, the recent developments in defence matters^{xxxix} only confirm the unstoppable road to federalising Europe. Defence cooperation is in their view the last bastion which will at long last fall to federalism. The failure of EDC in the 1950s was just a hiccup in the history of European integration. Now that the Cold War is over and Communism is gone, and now that the euro is about to make monetary union a reality, the EU can but only federalise its defence. In this school of thought only a full European federation of states could bring the integration process to its logical and successful end.

It is not surprising therefore that the Fischer-Schroeder vision has been described, to use Professor Herbert Kitschelt (Duke University)'s words, as a 'German Constitution writ large'^{xxx}. The July 2001 Commission *White Paper on European Governance* also follows that trend by arguing for more 'Community method' albeit more open, transparent and accountable^{xxxi}. More importantly for the current debate, *Le Monde* has argued that Schroeder's proposals were 'aux antipodes des theses francaises'^{xxxii}. This is slightly confusing as there are no national views that are either federalists or not. But *Le Monde* is right to say that the federal approach is not accepted by many in France. Be it Chirac or Jospin, but for different reasons, they react to the federalist view quite strongly. We now turn in the next section to the intergovernmentalist view of European integration before considering that of Jospin in the section that follows it.

INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

The second school of thought groups the supporters of the nation-state. They refute that all nationalism leads to war and devastation, or that it is the basis of all European ills. They argue instead that the nation-state is a major democratic advancement for Europe. The integration process is not seen as an alternative to the nation-state but as a way of reinforcing it. This is a typical Gaullist, even Thatcherite, view of a Europe of nation-states. There is however an important difference between the two former leaders of

France and the UK: a preference or a dislike of the USA. It is therefore not surprising that the main supporters of such an approach can be found in France's President Jacques Chirac and Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair^{xxxiii}.

Both stress that all that is needed is a Europe of nation-states (perhaps with a constitution, but this is of secondary importance). Chirac favours the possibility of a pioneer core group^{xxxiv}. Such a core could group the original six founding states, or even (a recent socialist idea) only a 'union a deux' between France and Germany^{xxxv}. The role of this core group would be to allow some of the EU states to integrate further and faster. A key characteristic of this proposal is that it would be open for others member states to join later. This proposal also means less input from existing EU institutions, be they the Commission or the European Parliament.

Chirac's vision is based on 'the United Europe of States' and not a federal united states of Europe^{xxxvi}. He spurned Fischer's approach as 'abstract, premature and divisive'^{xxxvii}. For the French President:

'Nos nations sont la source de nos identites et de notre enracinement. La diversite de leurs traditions propres, culturelles et linguistiques est une des forces de notre Union'^{xxxviii}.

In practical terms, both Chirac and Blair favour a strengthening of the role of the Council Secretariat. Blair also favours two specific developments:

- [i] more agenda setting through the Council;
- [ii] a second chamber made up of parliamentarians from national parliaments. In that respect, the EU is seen as a possible 'superpower' but not as a 'super state' (i.e. federal)^{xxxix}. Where Blair's proposal differs fundamentally and radically from Fischer's proposed Second Chamber is that, instead of a Senate representing the national states/governments, the UK Prime Minister wants a chamber made up of national parliamentarians. That is to say an increased role for the national parliaments of the EU states^l.

In other words, Blair is not opposed to further integration per se, but he wants to see the national governments play the leading role on the grounds that they enjoy democratic legitimacy. He argued in his June 2000 Warsaw speech:

‘We need to get the political foundations of the European Union right (...) These foundations are rooted in the democratic nation state’^{xii}.

He therefore agrees with Chirac on the representative and democratic role of the nation state and its institutions (particularly at the parliamentary level) in the integration process. As Yvon Bourges, the *President du Mouvement paneuropeen en France*, recently stressed, ‘[L]a responsabilite politique appartient au Conseil europeen’^{xiii}.

For the intergovernmentalists, it could be argued first that they consider integration to be more a sophisticated form of inter-state cooperation than an evolutionary process with an end product. In other words, integration, including of a supranational type, is only occurring because states see a need for it. Integration reinforces the role and importance of the nation state^{xiii}. In their view, any move towards a supranational structure or arrangement is always agreed voluntarily and accompanied with more traditional confederal arrangements which preserve the ‘gate-keeper’ role of the member states. It is also possible to withdraw from these arrangements if need be. The intergovernmentalists emphasise the ever growing role of the European Council and the continued vital input of other ministerial councils, the role of states be it in implementing common decision or altering existing arrangements (IGCs), or the exclusion of supranational institutions from key economic and other areas of public policy, and in particular, defence.

One could also note that this approach is also supported but the ‘Europe of the Nations’ political group in the European Parliament who openly favour a European confederation which would include all European states with no supranational institutions. Their vision also calls for an independent Europe in all fields, especially in defence^{xiv}. One does not however have to share such an approach to argue that it is the European Council and other ministerial councils, and not the Commission as originally envisaged in the Rome Treaty, that conduct the political functions in the EU.

A THIRD APPROACH

The third approach represents in my view a much more sophisticated version of how the EU works and what it is. It contains both an empirical and a normative dimension. Empirical, in the sense that it describes how institutional arrangements have evolved in the European Community/Union over the decades. Normative, because it implies that any reform proposals must bear in mind a more complex integration process which combines federal, confederal and other characteristics. So far, only one leading European politician has presented such a view in a coherent way: the French prime minister Lionel Jospin in his May 2001 speech. There is of course a dose of French politics due to the current cohabitation system. In that respect, Jospin had to be different but not too distinct from Chirac's vision in order to try and avoid internal politicking. But it would be wrong to see only petty national politics involved. There is much more to it. It is an important contribution to the wider future of Europe debate, 'un texte qui fera date', to use Jack Lang's words^{xlv}. It builds -although it must be stressed that Jospin does not explicitly or implicitly claim to do so - on a less known theory: confederal consociation. Hence, before I turn to the Jospin proposals, there is a need to describe the main tenets of such an approach.

Confederal Consociation

The Confederal Consociation model which builds on the literature on Consociationalism^{xlv}. It offers an excellent alternative explanation to the way the EU in general, and its decision-making process in particular, have developed over the years. In 2001, the main elements of Confederal Consociation as applied to the EU can be narrowed down to three main characteristics^{xlvii}.

- First, the elites dominate the integration process; as a result, the decision-making process is largely 'elite-driven'. There is no European *demos* nor European constitutional order, but rather a collection of national *demos*;
- Second, the member states still enjoy relative 'segmental autonomy' which is expressed in two different but interrelated ways:
 - [i] there is a 'veto right' which can be (and is often) exercised by a member state both formally and informally;
 - [ii] there exists proportional representation of one form or another, again formally or informally, at all levels in the central institutions (e.g. in the Council, the

Commission, the EP, the Directorate-Generals in the Commission, the various Secretariats, etc).

- Third, and finally, the 'Confederal' dimension in the Confederal Consociation model confirms the continued preponderance of the state, especially the national governments, in EU decision-making. Other national institutions of the EU member states, for instance parliaments, matter as well.

If one looks at the way the integration process has evolved over the past fifty years of integration, what cannot be denied in my view is that the original scheme (the founding fathers') of an ever growing supranational executive (Commission) and eventually more powers to the EP with less and less input from the nation-states (spill-over of legitimacy) has not materialised. To reinforce this argument, one could mention *pele mele*

- * the 1965/1966 Luxembourg Compromise which has introduced *de facto* the veto right;
- * the creation of the European Council in 1974 as evidence of the primary role of the member state governments;
- * the Maastricht Pillars structure in 1992 which prevented any further hope of a federal superstructure;
- * the existence of opt-outs (currency, defence, citizenship);
- * the concepts of subsidiarity, flexibility, reinforced cooperation, which have all made a Europe a-la-carte (Euro12, Schengen with non-EU members but not all EU members) a reality;
- * in foreign policy, the continued preponderance of 'big states' through formal or informal arrangements such as the Yugoslavia Contact Group or the very recent pre-summit meeting between France, Britain and Germany over counter-terrorism at the Ghent European Council meeting in October 2001.

This is a much more convincing interpretation of the way European integration has occurred since the end of WW2 than the traditional debate between the Federalists and their opponents. In other words, the 'end-product' of European integration is already here: it is a mix which contains federal, confederal, intergovernmental and consociational characteristics. What the Confederal Consociation models also shows is that there is less discrepancy between the way decisions are taken and policies are developed in the three

pillars of the EU. The idea that there is supranationalism in the first pillar and strict intergovernmentalism in the second pillar thus fails to consider that there is also an interrelationship between the two.

The Jospin proposals

In a speech couched in general terms initially, Jospin presents an analysis of the wider picture. He follows Fischer's approach in that respect. The point he tries to make is that institutional reforms reflect a wider vision of Europe and are mere instruments, not objectives in themselves. He stresses the common values and interests of the EU member states, the strength of European integration, and the need to avoid a renationalisation of policies. Because he is not, in his own words, 'un européen tiède', he does not want 'une Europe fade'.

Hence, his proposals try and reconcile the national and the European. The nation state remains at the core of political legitimacy and democracy in Europe, but, unlike the intergovernmentalists, the concept and reality of 'Europe' does exist and does matter. It also deserves to be preserved and consolidated. He wants at the same time more powers to Europe (Commission and EP) and more powers to member states (through the EU Council but also through the national parliaments). He suggests the possibility of an elected President of Europe. Jospin rejects both the transformation of the Council into a second chamber and the idea of a pioneer group.

Jospin's approach is based on Jacques Delors' recent re-alignment on how he views integration in Europe. Jacques Delors himself has moved from a federal approach *stricto sensu* to one which reconciles it with a role for the nation state. See his recent *audition* to the French Assembly where he:

'a rappelé que s'il avait proposé le concept de «Fédération d'Etats nations», c'est parce qu'il n'a jamais cru au dépérissement de la nation. Il s'est toujours démarqué sur ce point du mouvement fédéraliste qui, dans le contexte de l'après-guerre, a eu tendance à confondre «nations» et «nationalisme». Or, la globalisation du monde implique de préserver le cadre national. Ce concept de Fédération d'Etats-nations permet de concilier la double nécessité de préserver les nations et d'appliquer la méthode fédérale au système de décision. ^{xlviii}'

Thus, Jospin's "vision" is closer to what has actually happened and is happening in European integration. This is not to say that one has to agree with all of his proposals or with his wider political philosophy. Neither can a 'change of heart' on his part be excluded if he were to become president of France next year. It means that integration in Europe is more complex than the pro or anti supranational debate has shown to date.

It is not therefore surprising that another French 'elder statesman', Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, is now also claiming that the Council is at the heart of EU decision-making and that any future reform should reflect such a fundamental change in the way integration works in Europe^{xlix}. He even mentions Jean Monnet and says that the latter had agreed with his 1974 joint (with Helmut Schmidt) decision to institutionalise European summits of heads of state and government. Giscard is not only launching a bid to head the 'Convention on European institutions' due to start in March next year. He reflects in my view the growing awareness that Europe can evolve further without having to continue *ad nauseum* the dialogue of the deaf between federalists and intergovernmentalists. Confederal Consociation offers such a perspective. The Jospin proposals fall under such an approach even if the French premier does not say so.

CONCLUSIONS

This section reiterates the main point of the paper. It is possible to come to the conclusion that the 'dialogue of the deaf' between the supranationalist/federalist and the intergovernmentalists approaches to European integration has led to an impasse. Both approaches can afford to stress existing elements in the institutional and decision making structure of the EU which confirm the presence of either federal or intergovernmental features. But both fail to address the much more important question of why there are at the same time federal and intergovernmental features. To be selective is not only unfair it is misleading. In other words, the 'ludicrous dispute between "intergovernmentalists" and defenders of the "Community method"'¹ has been highly unproductive because it does neither represent an accurate account of how integration has evolved over the last fifty years, nor is it a good guide for future reforms.

Such a conclusion is arrived at mainly through an empirical observation of the way the EU has developed since its inception, but also thanks to alternative integration theories. In the previous section I suggested that an alternative approach, Confederal Consociation, offers both a better understanding of how the EU works and of how it has developed over the years. It will not be easy to change the way the EU has been analysed, described, and studied over so many decades. Several opponents to the Jospin model have described his 'federation of nation states' as 'une formule ... parfaitement contradictoire, et intellectuellement cynique'ⁱⁱ. The *UDF* MEP Jean-Louis Bourlanges has called it '[un] porte-avions qui aurait un moteur de Vespa'ⁱⁱⁱ. But such criticisms fall in the now traditional trap of believing, despite the evidence to the contrary, that one has either to take a pro-federal view or an intergovernmental approach.

In short, the ongoing 'dialogue of the deaf' between the federalists and the intergovernmentalists leads nowhere. The EU is more than intergovernmental but less than federal and, more importantly, not necessarily going down the path to federalism. Confederal Consociation offers a better alternative explanation and model. Even if one does not agree with the whole model, a serious and convincing answer must be given to Vedrine's rhetorical comments on the future of European integration:

'Le noeud de la reflexion, ce sont les concepts de federation et de federation d'Etats-nations. S'agit-il au bout du compte d' une seule et meme chose, le federalisme classique? [he goes on] Dans ce cas, nous allons vers un blocage'.

Further ammunition to the third approach to European integration can also be found in the fact that the Convention that will lead to the 2004 IGC is a combination of European and national actors. Where I disagree with the planned work plan is that it will then be an IGC once more (even if there are representatives of the Commission and the EP). A Confederal Consociation approach would have included national parliamentarians and EU institutions representatives in the IGC as well.

In my view, the Confederal Consociation model presents a realistic alternative to both federalism and intergovernmentalism. It is hoped this paper will help advance the current public debate over the future of Europe beyond this 'dialogue of the deaf'.

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² See Stavridis, S. (2001), *Why the 'Militarising' of the European Union is strengthening the Concept of a "Civilian Power Europe"*, EUI Working Paper RSC No.2001/17, Florence, June.

³ *International Herald Tribune*, 12 December 2000.

⁴ *Le Monde*, 12 December 2000.

⁵ *Financial Times*, 12 December 2000.

⁶ *Le Monde* editorial, 12 December 2000.

⁷ EP President Nicole Fontaine in *Le Monde*, 21 February 2001.

⁸ *Kathimerini*, 24 December 2000.

⁹ Cohen-Tanugi, L. (2001), 'Europe: une ambition qui s'érode sans cesse', *Le Monde*, 17 January.

¹⁰ From the discussion transcripts (my own translation) according to *El Pais* correspondent Carlos Yanoz, *Le Monde*, 20 Decembre 2000. Reading these 'transcripts' offers perhaps more insight into EU integration than many an academic book about the subject!

¹¹ Ludlow, P. (2001), 'The Treaty of Nice: Neither Triumph nor Disaster', *ECSA Review*, Spring, 4 (2): 1-4.

¹² Ross, G. (2001), 'France's European Tour of Duty or Caution - One Presidency May Hide Another', *Ibid.*, 4-6.

¹³ *Financial Times*, 27 February 2001.

¹⁴ *Le Monde* editorial, 31 December 2000-1 January 2001.

¹⁵ *Demoscopia* survey, in *El Pais digital* 15 January 2001.

¹⁶ *El Pais digital*, 30 April 2001.

^{xvii} Drweski, B. (2001), 'L'Union europeenne fait peur aux Polonais', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, January, 5.

^{xviii} Carlos Yarnoz (once more!), *El Pais digital*, 17 July 2001.

^{xix} *Financial Times*, 12 December 2000.

^{xx} The Upper houses in both countries must now bring the ratification process to a successful end.

^{xxi} See Stavridis, S. & Verdun, A. (2001), Special issue on 'Democracy in the three pillars of the European Union', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 10 (3), 213-349.

^{xxii} http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/2/r/r000512b.htm. *From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the finality of European integration*, Speech by Joschka Fischer, 12 May 2000. See also his 'Apologies to the UK, but 'federal' is the only way', *The Independent*, 16 May 2000.

^{xxiii} *The Independent*, 4 February 2000.

^{xxiv} *Financial Times*, 4 October 2000.

^{xxv} Speech by Romano Prodi, 'The New Europe in the Transatlantic Partnership', European University Institute, Florence, 9 May 2001.

^{xxvi} *Le Monde.fr*, 12 February 2001.

^{xxvii} See http://www.ekem.gr/agence_gr.html reproducing information based on *Agence Europe*, 1 August 2001, from an EKEM (Hellenic Centre for European Studies) seminar on 'The Future of Europe and Greece' held in Athens in early July 2001.

^{xxviii} *Liberation.com*, 14 June 2001.

^{xxix} for details on defence developments in the EU see Haworth, J. (2000), 'Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative', *Survival*, 42 (2): 33-55; Stavridis, S. (2001), *European Security and Defence after Nice*, Jean Monnet Working Paper 31.01, Catania, March.

^{xxx} Kitschelt, H. (2001), 'European Integration and Domestic Party Competition', RSCAS/EUI Luncheon Seminar, Florence, 8 May 2001.

^{xxxi} COM(2001)428 final.

^{xxxii} *Le Monde*, 3 May 2001. See also Hubert Vedrine's 'Reponse a Joschka Fischer', in *Le Monde*, 11-12 June 2000; 'Le Face-a-face Chevenement-Fischer', in *Le Monde*, 21 June 2000.

^{xxxiii} It is interesting to note that Blair has spotted this similarity of views between the two sides of the Channel, although he does not refer to Mrs Thatcher. He referred to De Gaulle who 'avait paradoxalement une conception de l'Europe proche de celle de la Grande-Bretagne', from his Warsaw speech (6 October 2000) as quoted in *Le Monde*, 8-9 October 2001.

^{xxxiv} Chirac also found support in that respect from the Italian President, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi. Quoted in *El Pais*, 7 July 2000. A similar proposal was made in 1994 in the so-called Lammers/CDU paper but it did not lead to any further developments at the time.

^{xxxv} See the Lamy, Strauss-Kahn, Nallet, Jeanneney (all French socialists) proposal as quoted in *El Pais*, 19 June 2001.

^{xxxvi} *The Independent*, 3 September 1998.

^{xxxvii} As quoted in *The Independent*, 31 May 2000.

^{xxxviii} 'Notre Europe', Discours prononce par Monsieur Jacques Chirac President de la Republique Francaise devant le Bundestag, 27 June 2000.

^{xxxix} Hill, C. (2001), 'Superstate or superpower? Conceptualizing the consequences of the CESDP', SPS Seminar Paper, EUI, Florence, 5 April.

^{xl} See also Wallace, W. (2000), 'A Senate for Europe?', *The House Magazine*, London, House of Lords, 6 November, 28-29.

^{xli} as quoted in *International Herald Tribune*, 7-8 October 2000.

^{xlii} Bourges, Y. (1999), 'Les competences de la Commission europeenne', in *Le Figaro*, 22 June.

^{xliii} See Milward, A. (1992), *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, London, Routledge.

^{xliiii} See MEPs William Abitbol and Paul-Marie Couteaux's article 'Europe: le debut de la fin?', in *Le Monde*, 17 March 2000.

^{xlv} *Le Monde*, 30 May 2001.

^{xlv} Lijphart, A. (1999), *Patterns of Democracy - Government Forms and Performances in Thirty-Six Countries*, New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 42-47. Taylor, P. (1997), 'Prospects for the European

Union', in Stavridis, S. & Mossialos, E. & Morgan, R. & Machin, H. (eds), *New Challenges to the European Union: Policies and Policy-Making*, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 13-41.

³⁴⁰ Chrysochoou, D. (1996), 'Europe's Could-Be *Demos*: Recasting the Debate', *West European Politics*, 19 (4), 787-801; Chrysochoou, D. (1997), 'Rethinking Democracy in the European Union', in Stavridis et.al. (eds), *New Challenges ...*, 67-85.

³⁴¹ Audition de Jacques Delors, Assemblée Nationale, Delegation pour l'Union européenne, Compte rendu No.149, Reunion du Mardi 19 Juin 2001 a 17hrs30. <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/Europe-rendus/c0149> . The former European Commission President and French Finance Minister remains very influential in the Socialist Party in France. See also his *Groupement d'etudes et de recherche 'Notre Europe'* institute [website: <http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/Delors.htm>].

³⁴² *Le Monde*, 16 October 2001.

³⁴³ Ludlow, 'The Treaty of Nice: Neither Triumph nor Disaster', *ECSA Review*, 4.

³⁴⁴ Entretien avec Louis Michel, ministre belge des affaires étrangères, *Le Monde.fr*, 20 July 2001.

³⁴⁵ in *Le Monde*, 30 May 2001.